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Small Boys are Big Men: Experiences
and Reflections from Child Soldiers
Fighting in Sierra Leone
Brigid Eckhart
"I was then a small boy, but I considered myself a
big man."1
Introduction
A brutal civil war raged for over a decade in Lhe
West African nation of Sierra Leone, and child soldiers
were used by all sides. Yet loo little remains understood about the experiences of these children. Speaking lo the difficulties in accessing and explaining the
role of child soldiers in this conflicl, human rights
organizations have variously referred to these children
as bolh victims and perpetrators of human rights
abuses. Their dual roles were reflected in their participation with the various armed groups involved in the
civil war. An examination of the experiences of child
soldiers reflects both significant variations and similarities within and among factions.
The civil war began in 1991 when a small, multinational force crossed into Sierra Leone from Liberia.
This group, the Revolutionary United Front for Sierra
Leone (RUF/SL) led by Foday Sankoh, declared as its
goal the overthrow of the corrupt regime of the All
1

Master Japo 's testimony before the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, from Appendix: Three: Part Two,
Transcripts of Public Hearings Held in the District Headquarter
Towns, Afternoon Session of Closed Hearing Held in Bo 011 l
May 2003, 125.
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People's Congress. 2 The incursion turned into war
when the ill-equipped and poorly trained Sierra Leone
Army failed to stop the RUF /SL. When the war became
vicious, few outside the region responded. With little
press beyond the occasional report of blood diamonds,
bn1tal amputations, or child soldiers, international
pressure to terminate hostilities was slow to materialize.
The war ultimately affected all of Sierra Leone,
engaging diverse groups who played ambiguous, and
often dubious, roles in the confiict, prolonging and
intensifying it. These included the Liberian leader
Charles Taylor, the mostly Nigerian Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG), the private military contractor Executive
Outcomes, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone, and
international diamond giants. The war went through
different stages, including points when the RUF/SL
seemed to be routed, and produced two coups d'etat,3
three peace agreements,4 and two elections.
2

J. Peter Pham, Child Soldiers, Adult interests: The Global
Dimensions of the Sierra Leone Tragedy (New York: Nova Science
Publishers, Inc., 2005), 83. This original insurgent group
composed of NPFL (National Patrio t Fro nt of Liberia) soldiers,
Burkinabes, and Sierra Leon eans, crossed into Sierra Leone on
March 23, 1991.
3
For more information about these coups d'etat see Gberi e,
A Dirty War, 97-113.
• The first agreement, Abidjan 1996, secured the rule of
President Kabbah by ending hostilities. The Conakry Peace Plan
of 1997 restored Kabbah to power af"ler lhc AFRC takeover. The
Lome Peace Agreement 1999 was supposed to end all fighting
after the RUF /SL's Freetown take over in January 1999. Peace
was finally enforced through the dPployment of UN troops and
assistance from British P'orces, and declared hostilities were
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Throughout these changing situations child soldiers emerged as emblematic of the civil war and its
brutality, as images of young boys with AK 4 7s slung
over their shoulders were featured in Western media.
Children fought on all sides of this war, including with
the RUF /SL, the Civil Defense Forces (CDF) , or
lcamajors, and the government army, the Republic of
Sierra Leone Military Force (RSLMF or SLA). 5 Sierra
Leone was not alone in its use of children as combatants. Children have fought in Columbia's con!lict,
joined both Protestants and Catholics in Northern
Ireland, and participated in the Palestinian conflict, to
cite a few examples. 6 Other wars in Africa have
deployed young troops as well; in particular Joseph
Kony's Lord's Resistance Army. Though these are
recent cases, the Nazis deployed Hitler Youth towards
the end of World Wax 11. 7 Despite the presence of
young combatants in m a ny past wars, sorne recent
circumstances may suggest why many contemporary
wars involve so many young participants. 8 Contem
declared over in January 2003 by the UN. (See both Gberie, /\
Dirty War and J. Peter Pham, Child Soldiers, Adult interests.)
5
The CDF were not always lcamajors, which is a Mende word
for hunter, other ethnic groups and political parties at various
points also organized Civil Defense Forces. The RSLMF is
described by Peters and Richards as ill-equipped and as
mimicking the tactics of the RUF /SL by training children to
fight. Krijn Peters and Paul Richards, "'Why We Fight': Voices of
Youth Combatants in Sierra Leone ," Africa68 2( 1998) : 184 .
6
P.W . Singer, Children al War (New York: Pantheon Books,
2005), 16.
7
Cockerill, Sons, 1-6.
8
It might likewise be interesting lo address why war often
excludes, rather than includes, c hildren. The reasons why
children are excluded or iucluJ ed cou ld relate to differing
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porary conflicts have proliferated small arms sufficiently light weight and easily operated- not to mention inexpensive -that even small children can fire
them. 9
Before addressing the case of Sierra Leone, it is
important to consider differing culturally determined
definitions of the child soldier. 10 Despite cultural
variations, international standards define a "child" as
those under the age of 18, with specific rights and
protections accorded them. While the most widely
accepted standard prohibits individuals under 15 from
participating in armed conflict, the Optional Protocol
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child raises the
standard to 18, the age UNICEF uses in its definition
of child soldiers. 11 Using either age classification,
many children, both boys and girls, fought in Sierra
Leone.

I
I
I
I

culture conceptions of appropriate ages; however this additional
facet is beyond the scope of this study.
9
Singer, Children, 45-6 ..
10
As is often a rgued many international standards set by
the UN Declaration of Human Rights were au thored from a
distinctly Western perspective, which may ignore cultural and
moral relativisms. However, these distinctions speak more to
questions of the genera l validity of international laws., than to
this precise issue.
11
UNICEF has defined a child so ldier as "any child - boy or
girl - under 18 years of age, who is part of any kind of regular or
irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including,
but not limited to: cooks, porters, messengers, and anyone
accompanying such groups other than family members . It
includes girls and boys recruited for forced sexual purposes
and/or forced marriage. The definition, therefore, does not only
refr:r to a chi ld who is carrying, or has carried, weapons." From
UNJCEF "Fact Sheet: Child Soldiers"
<http://www.unicef.org/protection/chiJdsoJdiers.pdf>.
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This study of child combatants in Sierra Leone
engages a range of primary sources. By drawing on
published interviews from a variety of sources, especially the transcripts of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) in Sierra Leone, and olher sources,
a sketch of the lived experiences of child combalants
emerges. 12 Another significant contribution to this
study is Ishmael Bea.h's A Long Way Gone: Memoirs of
a Boy Soldier, which chronicles his years fighting with
the army. Particular attcnlion will be paid to the
combatants' self-representation and experiences in
war. Also, the particular realities of girl soldiers will be
analyzed.
Previous scholarship has addressed the civil war
12

Intriguingly, these transcripts represent a re latively
untapped source for scholarly research. Also, it is important to
recognize that interviews can ufle11 be µrobl ematic, especially
when using interviews others conducted, where questions were
chosen by others. The TRC material includ es multiple narrative
testimonies of former child soldiers and others who encountered
them, followed by questioning by the Commission. However,
even these invaluable sources have some limitations . The
majority who shared their stories in the transcripts available
fought with the RUF /SL, which leaves little information for
comparison to those children who fought with the CDF and the
RSLMF. Notwithstanding these frustrating gaps of information,
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission transcripts provide
details and a quantity of accounts not found elsewhere. The
interviews and testimony were given originally in whatever
language the individual was most comfortable. The
transcriptions of these accounts were later translated into
English for the publication of the document used here Witness lo
Truth: Report of the Sierra Leo /le Truth alld Reconciliation
Commission, Aµµendices, retrieved from <
http://www.trcsierra!conc.org/ pdf/APPENDICES/Appendices%
20Content%20Page.pdf>.
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and the role of child soldiers. Sierra Leone scholar
Paul Richards takes issue with Robert Kaplan's widely
publicized "New Barbarism" theory, which asserts that
a senseless and criminally brutal form of warfare-exemplified in the Sierra Leone war-has recently emerged. 13 In contrast, Richards focuses on the
political motivations driving the violence . Some of his
work addresses child soldiers explicitly, including a
piece published with Krijn Peters containing interviews
with young combatants. 14 William Murphy analyzes
the children's relationships with their commanders,
viewing these relationships as a version of the
patrimonialism characteristic of Sierra Leone's postindependence government. 15 The commander or bra' 6
13

The so-r.c1llerl "New Barbarism" Theory was developed by
Robert D. Kaplan in his article "The Coming Anarchy" from
Atlantic Monthly, February 19':)6,
<http://www.globa Ipolicy .org/ nations/ future/ kaplan7 .htm>.
Through a variety of examples of sprawling poverty and city
slums, as well as examples of violence in developing nations,
Kaplan seeks to explain how those contemporary examples
forebode a new type of world order, or disorder, where violence
reigns, and a new type of purposeless war is waged for the sake
of violence and criminality itself. This theory was examined in
Paul Richard s's Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth, &
Resources in Sie1Ta Leone (Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann, 1996).
14
Peters, "'Why We Fight."'
15
First, aid organizations view them as "coerced youth," or
victims, who are generally lacking in personal agency,
susceptible to abduction, and thus in need of protection.
Second, the "revolutionary youth" model explains youth
involvement as a rebellion against a culture which marginalizes
them politically and economically. Third, the "delinquent youth"
image portrays child soldiers as economically exploiting their
wartime opportunities. Willia111 P. Murphy, "Military
Patrimonialism and Child Soldier Clientalism in the Liberian
and Sierra Leonean Civil Wars," African Studies Review, 46, no.
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of the child soldier protects, feeds, and watches over
the child, who in exchange is a fiercely loyal fighter.
Murphy posits that this relationship is a defining
feature of child soldiering in Sierra Leone. 17
David Rosen assesses the legacy of "youth thuggery" as a force in post-independence politics, manifested as an extension of the patrimonial state. 18 He
suggests that the growth of groups of alienated urban
youth emerged as urbanization facilitated both the
disintegration of family ties and generationally based
authority. 19 Rosen introduces the legacy of slavery,
including sexual slavery, forced labor, and slave
soldiery. Rosen's definition of a slave as someone
completely socially alienated from community and
family fits the condition of the captured children of the
RUF/ SL who were physically separated from their
farnilies. 20 Also, Rosen examines the warfare system
as part of the Poro system, a male secret association in
Mende society where initiated boys could be employed
as soldiers and considered ad ults. 21
2 (2003): 61-87.
16
Bra means "big brolher" in Krio, lhe mosl widely spoken
language in Sierra Leone.
11
Murphy, "Military Palrimonialism," 64-66 .
18
David M. Rosen, Armies of the Young: Child Soldiers in War
and Terrorism (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press,
2005).
19
Rosen, Armies of the Young, 59 .
20
Rosen, Armies of the Young, 59. Rosen also idenlifies that
lhere were reports of newly abducled recruils were forced lo kill
their own parents as an inlegral step of lhis brulal initiation
process.
21
Rosen, Armies of the Young, 58. Rosen applies the "New
Barbarism" lhesis lo lhe civil war, viewing the exlreme brutalily
of the war as evidence of ils va..lidily.
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Lansana Gberie disagrees with Richards's assertion
that the RUF /SL was a "misunderstood and misrepresented rural rebellion against the failed 'patrimonial'
state." 22 Instead, Gberie asserts that the RUF /SL had
no political ideology beyond attaining wealth and
power for Sankoh, and backer, Taylor. While Gberie
rejects Richards's attempt to articulate a RUF /SL
ideology where none seems to exist, he also disagrees
with Kaplan's assessment that youth, urban violence,
and overpopulation in Africa "have already reached
Gberie critiques Kaplan's sparse
crisis point." 2 3
experience and by extension his broad conclusions. 24

The Experiences of Child Soldiers in Sierra Leone
An analysis of the child soldiers' words reveals
these former fighters as vulnerable, exploited and
sometimes as killers. Many express their fears, their
difficulties coping with their actions, and their hopes
of forgiveness for their dreadful deeds. Their testimonies share common themes and patterns as they
describe their time as child soldiers: abduction or
recruitment, fear, training, initiation, indoctrination,
sexual crimes, drugs, and experiences of killing.
Although significant variations exist among the interviews from the different groups-RUF/ SL, lcamajors,
CDF, RSLMF, and renegade national army combat22

Gberie, A Dirty War, 13.
Gberie, A Dirty War, 142.
24
Gberie engages both Kaplan and Richard's interpretations
extensively in his book, A Dirty War, see 141-5 for more
information. Also significant was the extensive circulation of
Kaplan's article, especially among US e mbassies throughout the
world, which may have impac ted US policy towards Africa
during this period.
23

https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol13/iss1/6
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ants-many themes were similar. 25
There was more than one path to involvement as a
combatant, and these paths were generally related to
the faction joined. ln one survey of ex-combatants, the
majority of those surveyed who fought for the RUF/SL
were abducted, while a very small number of CDF
combatants surveyed reported forcible recruitment. 26
These survey results are substantiated by other
evidence. The RUF/ SL began a pattern of abductions
early on during the conflict, when its tactics of brutalizing the civilian population did not produce enough
volunteers. 2 7 Conversely, the CDF and other anti25

The "renegade national army" refers lo the sobel elements
discussed in nole 3. In this section, unless otherwise indicated,
the child soldier mentioned fought with the RUF/SL.
26
Macartan Humphreys, and Jeremy M. Weinstein, "What
the Fighters Say: A. Survey of Ex-Combatants in Sierra Leone ,
June-August 2003" (Center on Globalization and Sustainable
Development, Working Pape r No. 20, August 2004), 25 .
27
The vast majority of child soldiers interviewed through the
TRC were captured or abducted by the RUfi'/SL. See Fudie
Swarray's testimony before the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, from Appendix Three: Part Two, TranscriµLs of
Public Hearings Held in Lhe District Headquarter Towns, Closed
Hearings Held on 14 May 2003 in Kailahun, 283; Alex Jusu
Allieu's testimony before the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, from Appendix Three: Part Two, Transcripts of
Public Hearings Held in the District Headquarter Towns, Public
Hearings Held on 15 May 2003 in Kailahun. 290; Francis B.
Tucker's testimony before the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, from Appendix Three: Part Two, Transcripts of
Public Hearings Held in the District Headquarter Towns, Public
Hearings Held on 15 May 2003 in Kailahun, 296; and Master
Hassan Kamara's testimony before the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, from Appendix: Three: Part Two, Transcripts of
Public Hearings Held in the District Headquarter Towns, Ka mbia
District Closed Hearings , 11 June 2003, 755.
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RUF /SL contingents were able to attract Sierra
Leoneans wishing to protect their villages against
RUF/ SL campaigns of destruction.
Abduction or Recruitment?

Attacks on villages resulted in many deaths, while
the remainder, often young boys and girls, were
captured, many of them turned into soldiers, porters,
or sexual slaves. Many witnessed the death of parents
before being taken by the RUF /SL. One combatant,
Master Japo, abducted at age 10, reported being
"prepared to fight becaus e [he] had lost both
parents." 28 This loss, coupled with fear of being killed
if he refused, left him with no alternative but to fight
with the RUF/ SL. Many abductees related the fear
and threat of death if they refused to accompany the
rebels. 29 Fudie, 9 years old at capture, was at first
asked to carry loads, and reported that "the rebels
killed two of [the boys] simply because they said they
were unable to carry the luggage. "30
In contrast to the brutality that marked abduction
by the rebels, many of the children who fought with
the CDF volunteered to fight. Many of these youths
had also lost parents and had their homes and villages
destroyed; yet, instead of the resignation many
RUF /SL abductees felt toward their captors, the
intenriews suggest that some CDF and army soldiers
were often driven to seek revenge against the RUF /SL.
One RSLMF irregular described how the rebels had
28

Master Japo, 124-5.
For example, "He fired lwo shots in front of me and said if
I did not join them he would kill me." Alex Jusu Allieu, 290.
3
° Fudie Swarray, 283.
29
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taken his parents, and as a result he "tried to join the
army as a matter of revenging." 31 This combatant
related how he was incorporated into a fighting unit
through a system similar to the Poro system, in which
boys were initiated into adulthood and trained to
fight. 32 Another soldier stated that she "was defending
[her] country" as an irregular in RSLMF. 33
One
kamajor related that his armed participation fulfilled
his obligation to defend his people. 34 These accounts
suggest that CDF child combatants were more likely to
have volunteered than their RUF/SL counterparts.

Indoctrination/ Initiation/ Training
Indoctrination with RUF/ SL ideology often followed
abduction. The rebels appealed to children by offering
free education. 35 One child, Anthony, reported that
"they were telling us that we were not enjoying good
education under this go vernment; and that we should
have free education." 36 Physical initiation was another
form of indoctrination and often involved harsh treatment followed by shaving heads of abductees and/ or
inscribing "RUF" on the forehead or chest of the newly
31
Peters, "'Why We Fight,"' 189, see also 192 . An "irregular"
in lhe RSLMF was not recognized by the government and did not
receive any guaranteed compensation or proteclion.
32
Peters, "'W hy We Fight,"' 189.
33
Peters, "'Why We Fight,"' 191.
34
Pelers, '"Why We Fight,"' 196-7.
35
Francis B. Tucker, 299, and Anthony Andrew 'folio's
testimony before the Trulh and Reconcilialion Commission, from
Appendix: Three: Part Two, Transcripts of Pu blic Hearings Held
in the District Headquarter Towns, Kambia Dislrict Hearings, 12
June 2003, 774.
36
Anthony Andrew Tollo. 774. /\ minor transcriµLion error in
spacing has been changed in this quote.
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captured. 37 Fatmata noted that "la]t that time they
[RUF/ SL] had the practice of branding people, so that
you would not run away, even if you had the desire." 38
Coupled with the physical separation from their
families, the tattoo or inscription into the flesh of those
abducted further attenuated any ties with their former
communities. By outwardly manifesting their status
as rebels, the RUF /SL limited the children's ability to
escape and would eventually retard the process of
reintegration. Without much chance at acceptance if
they left the RUF /SL, they would be forced to integrate
into the only corporate group available to them-the
RUF /SL.
Starting with abduction, the RUF/ SL inculcated
norms of violence in its recruits, integrating them into
its organizational structure. Afraid that escape could
bring torture or death, abductees were transformed
into warriors following initia tion. Most underwent
some form of training, which ranged significantly in
scope and intensity, often involving weapons and
discipline training. Reports suggest that children died
" Fudie Swarray, 283.
Fatmata Jalloh's testimony before the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, from Appendix: Three: Part Two,
Transcripts of Public Hearings Held in the District Headquarter
Towns, Closed Hearings Held in Makeni on 28 May 2003, 481;
see also Mariama Mansaray's testimony before the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, from Appendix: Three: Part Two,
Transcripts of Public Hearings Held in the District Headquarter
Towns, Closed Hearings for in Koinadugu District, 4 May 2003,
385, and Kadiatu Sawaneh's testimony before the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, from Appendix Three: Part Two,
Transcripts of Public Hearings Held in Lhe District Headquarter
Towns, Public Hea1ings in Koinadugu District, 13 May 2003,
365.
38
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during these activities. Fudie described his training:
"They queued us up and lhey would send a gun lo us
and we were expected to catch it without allowing it lo
fall. As they sent the guns, we caught them. One
[child] ... allowed the gun lo fall and immediately he
was shot." 39 Another combatant, Alex, reported that
they were arranged in a straight line wilh "the gun on
our shoulder. If the gun was fired and you were not in
straight line, the bullet would hit you. The bullet hit
one boy on the head and he died." 4 ° Children were
taught to dodge bullets, wilh death coming to those
who failed. Master Bowanag added a scenario where
"[t]here was a hole over which a rope was hung .. . we
were requested lo go over lhe hole; swinging on the
rope. If one got tired and could no longer hold onto the
rope, one would fall into the hole and die." 41 By the
lime these children engaged in combat they would
have already seen many people killed, perhaps eroding
their aversion to death.
Other children, however, reported not undergoing
the type of training described by Fudie, Alex, and
Bowanag. Those seen as loo young for the training
camps were often lake11 as bodyguards under the
protection of their commander, or bra. Anthony, 13
when captured, staled Lhal he "was not allowed to
train early as I was clearly a child;" he also claimed
that his commander "loved [him] very much" and did
39
40

41

Fudie Swarray, 283.
Alex Jusu Allieu, 294.

Master Bowanag's testimony before the Truth and

Reconciliation Commission, from Appendix: Three: Part Two,
Transcripts of Public Hearings Held in the District Headquarter
Towns, Afternoon Session of Closed Hearing Held in Bo on l
May 2003, 118.
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not allow him to go to the training camps. 42 However,
since boys older than Anthony were sent to training
camps, his reason for not participating could indicate
wide variations among RUF /SL commanders with
regard to training.
Descriptions of the training of non-RUF /SL fighters
indicate that training was often limited to basic weapons instruction. One boy who joined the RSLMF as an
irregular at age 13 related that he "was trained to save
life and property" along with weapons training in the
AK 4 7, the RPG, and grenade launcher. 43 A soldier
who was recruited and trained by ULIMO at age 12,
Foday Sesay, reported undergoing "vigorous military
training for a month." 44 For child combatants, training
vacillated between deadly discipline and informal
instruction about guns.
Drug Culture
A culture of drugs among all groups often aided the
Reports
transformation of children into soldiers.
indicate a varying array of drugs distributed and
available to combatants, including marijuana, rum,
cigarettes, hard liquor, cocaine, palm wine, and a
gunpowder mixture. Although not all child combatants reported being exposed to drugs, many described
42

Anthony Andrew Tollo , 775-6, both the two previous
sentences quoted from Tollo.
43
Peters, '"Why We Fight,"' 190.
44
United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia
(ULlMO) was a group based in both Liberia and Sierra Leone
which aided the RUJ7 /SL . Ibrahim Abdullah and lshmail Rashid,
'"Smallest Victims; Youngest Killers': Juvenile Combatants in
Sierra Leone's Civil War," in Abdullah, Ibrahim, ed. Between

Democracy and Terror, 246.
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significant behavior alterations while intoxicated.
Combatants presented a variety of reasons for taking
drugs. Fudie, for in s tance, reported that after he
smoked marijuana he "could not distinguish between
grown ups and children." 45 Another youth, James,
described that the rebels "used to inject us with cocaine," and that "[a]fter l was given the injection l
didn't fear anything." 46 When questioned further,
James claimed that he would not have killed without
drugs. 47 Thus, Lhe drugs were used to reduce fear and
perhaps also to inhibit children's expressed aversions
to killing. Japo insisted that "without those drugs, we
couldn't work." Another combatant, Patrick Banagura,
admitted to using drugs, adding that he amputated a
man's hand because he "had been drugged." 48
ln addition to these RUF /SL combatants, several of
tl1e RSLMF irregulars r eported using drugs, claiming
that drugs aided them in fighting . One combatant
bought "drinks and smokes ... just to have some mind
[determination] to go and fight." 49 A female combatant
noted that "[ijf you take gunpowder before you sleep
you will wake with red [fierce] eyes" and that she "took
il lo become brave fo r battle." 50 An unnamed child,
45

Fudie Swarray, 284.
James Morseray's leslimony before th e Trulh and
Reconciliation Commission, from Appendix Three: Part Two,
Transcripls of Public Hearings He ld in lhe District Headquarter
Towns, Closed Hearings 1-!eld on 14 May 2003 in Kailahun, 277.
47
James Morseray , 277.
48
Master Palrick Bangura's les limony before lhe Truth and
Reconcilialion Co111missio11, from Appendix: Three: Part Two,
Transcripts of Public Hearings He ld in the District Headquarler
Towns, Kambia Dislricl Closed Hearings, 11 June 2003, 749.
49
Peters, '"Why We Fight,"' l90.
50
Pelers, '"Why We Fighl,"' 191.
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captured by the renegade national army, attributed the
dissolution of his fear to the white "powder to put in
our nose." 51 These accounts suggest that drug use
among child combatants spread to all factions, and
was employed for essentially the same purposes: to
inhibit aversion to killing; to soften responses to pain
and fatigue; and to manufacture bravery in the face of
fear. Moreover, it seems highly likely that many
children became addicted to one or more drugs while
fighting, which might have increased their loyalty to
the supplier of their drugs. Using drugs, commanders
simultaneously created more loyal and ruthless
fighters who were hardly aware of their actions and
fearless of death.
Diamonds
Not only did sales of diamonds allow the RUF/ SL to
continue and intensify the war despite a total lack of
popular support, they provided vast wealth to Taylor,
Sankoh, and any other interests willing to trade arms
for diamonds. 5 2 Though child soldier accounts about
diamonds are sparse, one combatant, James, reported
that "[t]hose who were abducted were forced to mine
diamonds and our bosses took ... the diamonds to the
Sierra Leone and Guinea border in exchange for
arms." 53 Japo described the role of outsiders in the
diamond trade; "Alimamy Balay came from Guinea and
51

52

Abdullah, '"Smallest Viclims,"' 250-1.
See Ian Smillie, Lansana Gberie, and Ralph Hazelton, The

Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security

(Ottawa: Partnership Africa Canada, 2000), <http://www.sierraleorw.org/ hea rlmatter . html >.
53
James Morseray, 281.
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bribed us to sell diamonds to him." 54 "We made
contacts with South Africans who gave us fuel and we
gave them diamonds," Japo continued, "Alimamy Baty,
Charles Taylor and Poto all sent representatives." 55
These events confirm connections between external
agents trading in diamonds and the supplies the
RUF/SL needed to continue its war. 56
Girls in Fighting Forces
Girls took part in the war on all sides. Many of
their roles involved sexual exploitation. Despite their
roles, the scale of involvement of female child soldiers
has been ignored by many post-conilict initiatives
aimed at demobilization and refritegration. Some
estimate nearly a quarter of the child combatants, and
nearly a third of the RUF /SL's child soldiers, were
female. Girl soldiers served in all capacities, as wives,
porters, and frontline fighlers. 57
54

Master Japo, 126.
Master Japo , 126. ln the same testimony, Japo also
confirms that all three individuals, and th e South Africans , were
actively supporting th e rebels.
56
Master Bowanag recalled another curious account of
diamonds. He relates how the "Red Cross were also coming there
Ito camp Zogoda l in their helicopter; they brought medicines and
ammunition for us and we, in turn, gave lhem diamonds,"
(Master Bowanag , 122, emphasis added). lt is difficult lo access
the accuracy of such a claim.
57
Using the term "wives" can be problematic; some refer lo
them as "bush wives" suggesting that they were not formalized
marriages. However, both connote a more formal sexual
relationship where a commander or male combatant is in some
capacity responsible fur his "wife." See Susan McKay and Dyan
Mazurana, Wh e re are the Girls?: Girls in Fighting Forces in
Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone ancl Mozambique: Their Lives
During and Ajler War, (Montreal: lnlernalional Centre for
55
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Central to the lives of all girl combatants were their
sexual experiences. The rampant commission of
sexual crimes has been documented by Human Rights
Watch. 58 Many girls were integrated into the fighting
community through the role of "bush wife." Serving as
commanders' and soldiers' wives, some girls exhibited
McKay's interviews
authority within the camps.
indicate that wives, in addition to their domestic
duties, were often trained in firearms, with many
fighting on the frontlines .5 9 Their integration into
command structures and family units was essential to
their everyday survival, since being a wife ensured
girls access to food and often protection. For instance,
Fatmata reported that the male RUF /SL soldier who
abducted, raped, and took her as his wife tried to
protect her from training and from other men who
might otherwise have raped her. 60 Alternatively,
McKay relates how sometimes "commanders' 'wives'
were replaced by more-favored girls . . . [with] the
rejected 'wives' . . . serving as front-line fighters." 61
Thus, favored wives could be protected from the most
dangerous jobs, whi le the remaining wives and girl
soldiers might be more vulnerable to dangerous
Human Rights and Democratic Development, 2004). For the
statistics on involvement see McKay page 92.
58
Human Rights Watch, Sierra Leone: "We'll Kill You if You
Cry": Sexual Violence in the Sierra Leone Conflict, (Human Rights
Watch Vol. 15, no. 1 (J\) January 2003).
59
McKay, Where are the Girls? 92-3.
6
° Fatmata Jalloh's testimony before the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, from Appendix: Three: Part Two,
Transcripts of Public Hearings Held in the District Headquarter
Towns, Closed Hearings Held in Makeni on 28 May 2003, 48 1-6.
She was thirteen at the time.
61
McKay, Where are the Girls? 94.
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combat.
Many girls, howev er, including those who eventually became wives, were raped repeatedly and by
Maria.ma related that after being
multiple men.
abducted, "we were raped ... [and] they inscribed RUF
on our bodies . . . we were distributed to different
rebels as wives. When we refused, they flogged us. We
were raped by two or three men daily ... We eventually got married to them." 6 2 Her testimony reveals the
sexually violent process through which she became a
wife. Fatu, abducted by the RUF /SL, reported being
raped violently and repeatedly during her captivity.
However, she was not trained and instead cooked for
the rebels. 63
Other armed groups also used girls. The CDF,
though it claimed otherwise, also deployed girls.
McKay addresses the Kamajors and the Gbethis who
employed girls in a variety of roles. 64 While some of
the girls fighting with CDF units had been integrated
through their husbands, a lready CDF soldiers, others
were forcibly recruited into the ranks. Catherine
recalled how "the RUF would sweep through villages
abducting many of the boys, the Kamajors would often
62
Mariama Mansaray's testimony before the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, from Appendix: Three: Part Two,
Transcripts of Public Hearings Held in the District Headquarter
Towns, Closed Hearings for in Koinadugu District, 4 May 2003,
385.
63
Falu Conteh's testimony before the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, from Appendix: Three: Part Two,
Transcripts of Public Hearings Held in the District Headquarter
Towns, Closed Hearings for in Koinadugu District, 4 May 2003,
396. She was ten when captured.
64
See McKay, Where are lhe Girls? 95-6, for- more
information about these roles.
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target the remaining girls." 65 Another example is a
RSLMF irregular who joined for revenge, and related
how rape could be a punishment, "[t]hey would rape
us if we retreated." 66 While some of the experiences of
girl combatants were similar to those of the boys,
others varied significantly. Many girls reported some
form of sexual violence, whether eventually normalized
through a bush marriage or not. 67
A Closer Look: A Long Way Gone
None of the interviews provide as detailed an
account of the war as Ishmael Beah. The war forced
Beah to flee the advancing rebels with a group of other
boys, facing danger as adults exhibited their fear of
"boys our age." 68 Beah fled for months and was
devastated when the rebels d e stroyed the village that
had been his family's refuge, killing his en lire family in
the process. After he witn esse d the death of his
family, he was coerced into joining the SLA by an army
commander who told them "They [the RUF/SL] have
lost everything that makes them human. They do not
deserve to live. That is why we must destroy every
single one of them." 69 Training began immediately,
and throughout the process his commander told them
to "Visualize the enemy, the rebels who killed your
parents, your family, and those who are responsible
65

McKay, Where are th e Girls? 97 .
Peters, '"Why We Fight,"' 192 .
67
Ofte n these relationship s res ul ted in chi ldre n, a nd in
some cases these "wives" re main ed with their husbands after the
war e nded .
68
Ishm ae l Beah, A Long Way Gone: Me moirs of a Boy Soldier,
(New York: Sarah Crichton Books, 2007 ), 37.
69
Beah, A Long Way Gone, 108.
66
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for everything that has happened to you." 70 Beah
learned how to operate, maintain, and fire his AK 47,
and he became inducted into a drug culture. He
began "sniffing brown brown, cocaine mixed with
gunpowder;" which gave him energy and numbed him,
making him a fierce fighter. 71
He reflected: "My squad was my family, my gun was
my provider and protector, and my rule was to kill or
be killed ... and it seemed as if my heart hadfrozen."12
The army became a surrogate family for him because
it was "slightly orgaJ.1ized," while fighting becaJ.ne his
normalized reality. 73 After two years of combat, Beah
was chosen for a UNICEF demobilization program.
Reflecting, he commented that "I was too drugged ..
to realize the danger." 74

Child Soldiers Reflect on Their Eirperiences and
Responsibility
Through a multipart process children were turned
into killers. Child combatants terrorized people using
amputations and rape.
When reflecting on their
actions, the children's words reveal three somewhat
divergent viewpoints: taking individual responsibility
for their actions; claiming a collective responsibility; or
70

Beah, A Long Way Gone, 112.
Beah, A Long Way Go ne, 121.
72
Beah, A Long Way Go n e, 126, emphasis added.
73
Ishmael Beah, book tour, Berkeley, California, February
23, 2007.
74
Beah, A Long Way Gone, 15 I. Despite, or perhaps because
of, his revelations Beah gradually regained his lost humanity. He
accomplished this through recognition of his actions, when he
began to trust people and to have co mpassion for them again.
Thus, leaving his drugged slate behind, he expressed his
humanity.
71
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expressing uncertainty about the result of their
actions.
Children from the different groups presented
statements about responsibility for death . Master
Japo accepted responsibility with a caveat: "I am not
denying that I kill[ed] ... but I never killed an innocent
person. 1f one asked me not to kill him or her, I would
ask that person to join the revolution." 7 5 Japo perhaps
reveals his indoctrination into the singular "morality"
of the cause promulgated by the RUF /SL. Additionally, two H.SLMF irregulars acknowledged their actions
which included killing people. 76 Momoh, renegade
national army, admitted responsibility for his actions,
stating that he "killed many people," but "I pray to God
for forgiveness." 77 In contrast, others reported their
actions in somewhat vague co llective first person
statements that did not explicitly recognize their
individual responsibility. For instance, Patrick began
several statements with "[w]e killed." 78 Anthony also
described that "We now killed . . ." 79 His phrasing
suggests a sense of group, rather than personal,
agency . Master Rokono, 6 years old when abducted,
acknowledged both group and personal responsibility
for killing. 8 n Despite the contrast between the "I" and

I

75

Master Japo, 126, emphasis added .
See Peters, "'Why We f7ighl,"' 19 I and 195.
77
Abdullah, "'Smallest Viclims,"' 250.
78
Master Patrick Bangura, 750.
79
Anthony Andrew Tollo, 776.
80
Master Rokono's testimony before the Trulh and
Reconciliation Comm ission, from Appendix Three: Parl Two,
Transcripts of Public Hearings He ld in Lhe District Headquarter
Towns, Afternoon Session of Closed Hearing Held in Bo on l
May 2003, 113 and 115.
76
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"we" stalements, it cannol be cerlain lhat collective
stalements connote a complete denial of personal
responsibility, although the plural usage does remove
individual agency.
Perhaps the mosl fascinaling of lhe calegories of
responsibility are tho se who are unsure whelher they
killed or not. Falma la , for example, claimed that "I
cannot tell you lhat I have ever killed somebody facially;" at the same lime, she stated that she "must
accept that I killed." 8 1 Fudie also expressed uncerlainty, stating that "There were times when you were
retreating and shooting at lhe same time, and you
would have killed without knowing." 82 While Fudie's
statement suggests that he might have killed during
combat, he also blamed confusion on the battlefield for
making his aclions indefinile. A lcamajor concurs: "I
am not sure if I have killed s omebody .... [M]ay be you
are pointing at one man a nd your neighbor a lso [is
aiming] at the same man ... [bjut you will not be able
to identify [which ones you killed] because lher e were
many in the action ."83 Des pile lheir words, it is likely
that these individuals killed. This distancing mechanism might also h a ve made lheir r e inlegration into
society easier.
When reflecting on their lives as soldiers, some
children expressed a fondness for soldiering. One
child who foughl wilh RSLMF slate d lhat he enjoyed
being near his bro th e r, also a soldier, and lha t he
"liked the soldier work." 84 Another RSLMF irregular
81

82
83
84

Fatmata Jalloh, 2 9 8.
Fu<lie Swa .rray, 285 .
Pe te rs, "'Why We Fig ltl, "' l 98 .
Pe te rs , '"Why We Fighl, .,, 2 0 2.
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reported that he "liked to be free in the country[side],"
and that he "loved the work" of "saving life and property. " 85 The second also believed he was fighting to
defend the land against the rebels. 8 6 A third RSLMF
irregular reflected on his experience: "l liked it in the
army because we could do anything we liked to do ....
I was free." 87 This young combatant's statement
chillingly elucidates his enjoyment of the soldier life
due to the power he exercised over adult civilians.
Japo expressed that "l was then I big man in the
jungle."8 8 Japo considered himself an adult, since his
position with the RUF/SL as a commander gave him
the power he ordinarily lacked as a child in Sierra
Leone society.
The TRC transcripts also offered a venue for these
children to seek forgiveness from their fellow Sierra
Leoneans. Alex provided an elaborate statement that
epitomizes these sentiments:
I am saying to my people and the entire country
that I was under pressure when I committed all
those atrocities ... . Please forgive me for whatever wrong I have done and I have come today
asking you to embrace me as there is no evil
forest to throw away wicked children ... Please
forgive me and embrace me. 89
Alex named the rebels as responsible for his actions
and those of his fellow child soldiers. Moreover, his
85

86
87

88
89

Peters, "'Why We Fight,"' 190.
Peters, '"Why We Fight,"' 189 .
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Maste r Japo, 125.
Alex Jusu Allie u , 295.
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words reveal the difficulties that children, particularly,
faced as ex-combatants when attempting reintegration
into their communities after the war officially ended.
Conclusion
The RUF /SL invasion of Freetown in January 1999
was a watershed for the entire conflict. After two
weeks of continuing violence, CDF units and ECOMOG
forces were able to push the rebels out of Freetown.
Widely publicized accounts of Freetown atrocities
focused vital international attention on the wa.r. 90 The
prominent role of child soldiers in Freetown verified
the RUF/SL's successful use of children as fighters,
manipulated by a cullure of violence and drugs. 91
Furthermore, the attack on Freetown confirms the
experiences of child combatants whose stories have
been told here. Despite similarities between experiences, significant and important discrepancies exist
among the realities of child soldiers fighting both
within and beyond different groups. Most soldiers
were the products of indoctrination, training, and drug
addiction. Moreover, their extreme youth conditioned
their lack of a sense of individual responsibility; many
former child soldiers deny individual culpability for
violence . Because of these factors, the role of their
agency in perpetrating these violent and horrific acts
is complex. After handing over their weapons lo UN
peacekeepers, child soldiers entered Disarmament,
90

Ullimalely, lhis allenlion facililated Lhe crealion of
UNAMSlL lo enforce the Lome Accord, signed in the monlhs
afler lhe invasion.
qi Gbe rie, A Dirly War, 151.
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Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs. 92
Moreover, it remains to be seen how the legacy of
these child combatants will affect the future of Sierra
Leone. However, the recovery of Sierra Leone from this
violent period does not only involve dealing with child
combatants, but with communities responsible for
reintegrating former fighters into their villages. Also,
cultural and religious traditions need to be
considered. 93 Hopefully, processes at the level of
national justice will also aid in the reconciliation of the
entire country. 94 Despite lhe possibility for closure
and healing, the RUF/ SL's trademark tactic of terror
will ensure that the war and its victims will not be
forgotten. While it might be possible for child soldiers
to be rehabilitated and reintegrated, this process
cannot heal the permanent scar and loss of limbs
suffered by lh e amputees.
For decades Sierra
Leoneans will have a visual reminder of the bloody and
violent war.
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For more detailed inform ation on m any of these issues
and chalJenges see Michael Wessells and Davidson Jonah,
"Recruitment and Reintegration of Former Youth Soldiers in
Sierra Leone: Challenges of Reconciliation a nd Post-Accord
Peace Building," from Trou.blemalcers or Peacemakers?: You.th
and Post-Accord Peace Bu.ilding, Siobhan McEvoy-Levy, ed.
(Notre Dame, In.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006).
However, many obstacles hindered this process, including
poverty, lack of educational and employment opportunities, and
drug addiction.
93
These points were also touched on by Beah at the talk in
Berkeley.
94
The Special Court for Sierra Leone was set up to facilitate
the justice aspect; for more inJormat ion about the Special Court
see Gberie's A Dirty War.
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